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Most of the laboratory research in political science follows the style that was pioneered
in experimental economics a half-century ago by Vernon Smith. The connection between
this style of political science experimentation and economics experimentation parallels the
connection between economic theory and formal political theory.
This is no accident. In both cases, researchers who were trained primarily as theorists
- but interested in learning whether the theories were reliable - turned to laboratory exper-
iments to test their theories, because they felt adequate ﬁeld data was unavailable. These
experiments had three key features. First, they required the construction of isolated (labora-
tory) environments that operated under speciﬁc, tightly controlled, well-deﬁned institutional
rules. Second, incentives were created for the participants in these environments in a way
that matched incentives that existed for the imaginary agents in theoretical models. Third,
the theoretical models to be studied had precise context-free implications about behavior
in any such environment so deﬁned, and these predictions were quantiﬁable and therefore
directly testable in these laboratory.
In fact, one of the key innovators of political science experimentation is Charles Plott, who
conducted early economics experiments as well, to test the eﬀect of economic institutions and
rules on trade and exchange. It was a short but important step to use the same methods to
compare diﬀerent political institutions and rules vis-a-vis policy outcomes. Just as economic
theory had models that made quantitative predictions about behavior in markets, formal
political theories had begun to make precise quantitative predictions about behavior in non-
market settings, such as elections, committees, and juries.
It is also no accident that this brand of experimentation followed rather than preceded
similar research in economics. The lag in political science experimentation relative to eco-
nomics reﬂects a similar lag in developing rigorous theory.
T h i sc h a p t e rw i l lb eo r g a n i z e da r o u n dar o u g hc l a s s i ﬁcation of four kinds of political
science experiments that use the political economy/formal theory approach. This is obvi-
ously not an exhaustive list, and the discussion is intended to draw out the main insights
from these experiments rather than being comprehensive (this would require a book-length
chapter) They are: (1) committee decision making;( 2 )elections and candidate competition;
(3) information aggregation and committees;a n d( 4 )voter turnout and participation games.
The initial political economy experiments investigated the most fundamental principle of
the theory of committees: committees operating under majority rule will choose Condorcet
winners when they exist.A t ﬁrst glance, this seems almost like an obvious point, but it
turns out to depend in very subtle ways on what is meant by "operating under majority
rule." Testing this basic hypothesis is as fundamental to political science as the discoveries
1by Vernon Smith that markets organized as double auctions result in competitive equilib-
rium prices and quantities — and that markets organized in other ways may not converge to
competitive equilibrium. The bottom line for both kinds of experiments — the ﬁrst political
science experiments and the ﬁrst economics experiments — was the quantitative equilibrium
theories work pretty well in some settings, but institutions matter. While there was lots
of casual evidence and qualitative historical analysis, laboratory experiments provided the
ﬁrst non-circumstantial evidence that institutions matter — and identiﬁed exactly how. Be-
sides being non-circumstantial evidence, it also provided us with replicable evidence, and
with precise comparative static tests about how changing preferences and institutions lead
to changes in committee outcomes. And these eﬀects could be clearly identiﬁed as causal,
in the sense that preferences and institutions created in the laboratory are, by design, ex-
ogenously speciﬁed and controlled, while with the inherent limitations of historical data, one
can only make weaker claims about correlations between preferences, institutions, and out-
comes. Controlled laboratory experimentation circumvent problems of spurious correlation
and endogeneity.
The next section of this chapter will examine two quite diﬀerent approaches to the study
of committee decision making. First it will explore and discuss in more detail the ﬁndings
from this ﬁrst line of political science experiments, which, in addition to studying institutions,
also focus on questions of testing or improving cooperative game theoretic solution concepts .
Second, we will discuss more recent experiments on committee bargaining that are designed
to test theories from noncooperative game theory, focusing mainly on questions of distributive
politics where Condorcet winners do not exist, in contrast to the earlier focus on the Downs-
Hotelling spatial model with Euclidean preferences.
The second wave of political science experiments, which followed quickly after the ex-
periments on the majority rule core, investigated the question of Condorcet winners in the
context of competitive elections rather than small committees. These studies address a wide
range of questions, all of which have received the attention of empirical political scientists
for decades. The key questions we will focus on here are: retrospective voting; the Downsian
model of spatial convergence of candidate platforms in competitive elections; the impor-
tance of polls in transmitting information to voters and coordinating voting behavior in
multicandidate elections; and asymmetric competition that leads to candidate divergence.
More recently, both formal theorists and experimentalists have become interested in the
problem of information aggregation in committees. The problem was posed originally by
Condorcet and has become known as the Condorcet jury problem. Each member holds a
piece of information about the true state of the world. The committee is charged with making
a decision, and the correct decision depends on the state of the world. We will discuss brieﬂy
the experimental ﬁndings for Condorcet juries, and related issues of information aggregation
through social learning.
2An independent line of research, but one which has signiﬁcant implications for mass elec-
tions, investigates factors aﬀecting voter turnout. More generally, this includes participation
games, and a wide range related phenomena involving coordination problems such as the vol-
unteer’s dilemma. Experimental studies of abstract games, in particular the game of chicken
and the battle of the sexes, are also closely related. The third section of this chapter will
try to highlight some of the insights and regularities across this wide range of experimental
research.
2 Experiments in Committee decision making
This section discusses: (i) the earliest experiments that study the majority rule core and
other concepts central to cooperative game theory; and (ii) more recent experiments that
study committee bargaining under majority rule. Both of these kinds of experiments study
allocation problems where the members have conﬂicting preferences over the possible out-
comes.
2.1 Committee Bargaining in Multidimensional Policy Spaces
This line of research, beginning with the landmark article by Fiorina and Plott (1978),
explores two distinctly diﬀerent kinds of questions. First, it tests the basic theory of the
core in small committees, and examines it’s robustness with respect to the ﬁne details of
committee procedure.1 This can be thought of as a "comparative statics" questions. The
theory says that as preferences and/or procedures change in certain ways, outcomes from
committee deliberation should change in corresponding ways. Second, it explores what
happens in case the core fails to exist. We know from Plott (1967), McKelvey (1976,1979)
and Schoﬁeld (1983), that nonexistence problems are rampant in these environments.
The basic theoretical structure in most of these experiments is the following. The set
of feasible alternatives, A, is a convex concave subset of <2, usually a square or rectangle.2
There is a ﬁnite set of members of the committee, I = {1,...,i,...,n} with Euclidean pref-
erences, where n is an odd number for most experiments. Therefore, the environment is
fully speciﬁed by [A,I,x],w h e r ex =( x1,...,xi,...,xn) ⊆ An is the proﬁle of members’ ideal
1The core is a concept developed in cooperative game theory as the set of outcomes that are stable with
respect to coalitional deviation under some well-deﬁned institution. This is fomally modeled as a game
in characteristic function form. An outcome is in the core if there doesn’t exist some alternative feasible
outcome that makes some subset (coalition) of individuals better oﬀ and that cannot be blocked by the
larger group.
2In the actual experiments, the outcome space is given by a ﬁnite grid of points on the plane.
3points. For any such environment, we can deﬁne the simple majority rule binary relation.
For any pair of alternatives, a,b ∈ A,w ew r i t ea Â b if a majority of the members of I strictly
prefer a to b.I n t h i s c a s e ,w e s a y a defeats b under majority rule. If a does not defeat b,
we write b º a. The majority rule core, or the set of Condorcet winners, C ⊆ A, includes
precisely those alternatives that are undefeated under majority rule. That is C = {c ∈ A |
c º a ∀a ∈ A}. An implication of the results in Plott (1967) is that in these environments,
if n is odd and the xi are all distinct, then (i) the core coincides with one of the member’s
ideal points, call it xi∗ and (ii) the other members can be paired up in such a way that for
each pair, the line connecting the ideal points of the pair pass through xi∗. The condition
is sometimes referred to as pairwise symmetry, and has a natural generalization to environ-
ments with arbitrary quasi-concave and continuous preferences with ideal points, in terms
of pairs of utility gradients at the core point.3
2.2 Fiorina and Plott (1978)
Fiorina and Plott (1978) created sixty-ﬁve ﬁve-member laboratory committees, each of which
deliberated under a simpliﬁed version of Roberts’ Rules. The policy space included a ﬁne grid
of points in a two dimensional policy space. The two dimensions in the model correspond
to policy choices, such as spending on defense and tax rates, but no labels as such were
used in the experiments in order to maintain a neutral context. The policy space was,
literally, the blackboard. Preferences were induced using monetary payments that depended
on the outcome and diﬀered across subjects. Iso-payment contours (indiﬀerence curves) were
either concentric circles or ellipses, so this method extended to committee environments the
induced value approach pioneered by Smith (1976) in market settings. Deliberation by each
committee started at a status quo point that generated low payoﬀs for all members. Members
could raise their hands and propose alternative points; a vote between the status quo and
the alternative ensued, with the alternative replacing the new status quo point if it passed by
receiving a majority of votes. This process could continue indeﬁnitely, as long as members
made new proposals. At any point, a member could make a motion to adjourn. If the motion
to adjourn passed, the session ended and subjects were paid based on the last alternative that
had passed (or the original status quo, if no alternative ever passed). The main treatment
variable in the initial experiment was the preference proﬁle, using two preference proﬁles
for which a core existed and one where a core did not exist.4 I nt h et r e a t m e n tw h e r ea
3Some experiments have been conducted using elliptical indiﬀerence curves, rather than circular (Euclid-
ean). In this case the gradient version of pairwise symmetry applies.
4There also some some minor treatment variations regarding payoﬀ magnitudes and communication
limitations.
4core point did not exist, the ideal point of one voter was shifted a small distance, breaking
pairwise symmetry. Thus, this treatment was designed to test whether the discontinuous
nature of core existence would lead to a discontinuous change in committee outcomes. It
was an important variation to investigate, since results by McKelvey on global cycling (or
"chaos") were widely interpreted at the time as implying anything can happen in the absence
of a core point.
The principal ﬁndings were:
1. Core Clustering. When it exists, the core is the best predictor among 16 competing
hypotheses to explain committee outcomes. While few outcomes are exactly at the
core point, the outcomes tend to cluster nearby the core point, when it exists.
2. Robustness. The secondary treatments had little eﬀect, although there was greater
variance of outcomes when payoﬀ magnitudes were low (low incentives).
3. Continuity. When the core point did not exist, but the preference proﬁle was close to
admitting a core point, the outcomes still clustered around a region in the policy space
in much the same way as was observed when a core point existed! Thus, it appears
that the distribution of committee outcomes varies continuously with the preference
proﬁle of the members.
The third of these observations is perhaps the most important. Why? The theory of the
core is not a behavioral theory, but simply a property of the majority rule binary relation.
The deliberation procedure, while simple to describe, is virtually impossible to model as
an extensive form game. There is no theory of who makes proposals, no theory of how
people vote on proposals, no theory of adjournment, and so forth. That is, Fiorina and Plott
(1978) and subsequent studies along the same line investigate environments and procedures
for which there is no accepted behavioral model to describe or predict individual actions.
These are experiments that test axiomatic theories of social choice, not behavioral theories.5
2.3 The robustness of core clustering.
With few exceptions, subsequent research has reinforced most of the conclusions above. Berl
et al. (1976) investigate some variations on the original Fiorina and Plott (1978) study,
showing robustness to a number of factors including additional variations in preferences
5Fiorina and Plott and later studies suggest alternative hypotheses that are suggestive of a behavioral
model (such as fairness), but do not construct or test such models.
5(using city block metric preferences).6 In a later study, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984)
restrict agendas to issue-by-issue voting; they ﬁnd that outcomes still cluster around the
core. This, together with the ﬁndings about limitations on debate/communication illustrate
how robust core clustering is with respect to signiﬁcant procedural variation.7
Rick Wilson and his coauthors have conducted a range of diﬀerent variations on Fiorina
and Plott One of the most interesting assessed everyone on the committee a ﬁxed cost (called
an "agenda access cost") whenever a proposal is successful (Herzberg and Wilson 1991). This
has two interesting and countervailing eﬀects. First, it expands the set of core outcomes.
For example in the Fiorina and Plott environment without a core, a core point exists even
with small access costs. The second eﬀect, is more subtle. Because changes are more costly,
members are more reluctant to vote for any change, and this creates a drag on the process.
Voters might vote against a change that makes them better oﬀ in the short run, because
they fear the change will lead to further changes incurring additional costs. The ﬁndings
therefore are mixed. For example, if a core already exists in the absence of access costs,
then imposing access costs leads to more dispersion in the ﬁnal outcomes, a negative eﬀect.
Outcomes still cluster near the core, but with more scatter, and occasionally the process fails
entirely, without every moving away from the initial (bad) status quo. These experiments
are instructive because they suggest behavioral models of individual behavior, such as risk
aversion. They also suggest that individuals are not myopic in their voting decisions, but
anticipate the future consequences of current votes.
Plott conducted additional experiments showing that the results replicate to larger com-
mittees8 and also for committees where there was agenda control by one or more of its
members. In Kormendi and Plott (1982), one member of a ﬁve member committee serves
as a gatekeeper (called a "convener" in the paper) who was allowed to oﬀer or unilaterally
block proposals, in an environment with the same preferences as one of the Fiorina and Plott
core treatments. This agenda power restriction changes the core, since blocking coalitions
must include the agenda setter. The core expands and becomes the line segment between
the original core point and the agenda setter’s ideal point. The outcomes line up closely with
the core predictions. Hence these experiments show that the majority rule core, modiﬁed
to account for changes in proposal procedures, continues to predict committee outcomes.
An important corollary is that subtle changes in procedures can cause dramatic changes in
outcomes, as predicted by game theory.
There are some exceptions to the robustness of core clustering. One striking result is
6In spite of the earlier publication date, the experiments reported in Berl et al. (1976) were motivated
by an early version of Fiorina and Plott (1978).
7With issue-by-issue voting, a new alternative can alter the status quo on only one dimension.
8Plott (1991) replicates the FP results for committees with between 23 and 45 members.
6described in Eavey and Miller (1984a), which follows up on an earlier experiment by Isaac
and Plott (1978).9 Isaac and Plott studied 3 person committees with a convener, but with
only a ﬁnite set of possible outcomes, so the environment was not framed to the subjects as
a two dimensional policy space. There is a unique core, which predicts outcomes very well.
Eavey and Miller point out that the core in that experiment was also a fair outcome that gives
something to everyone. They designed a "critical" experiment in which the fair outcome is
diﬀerent from the core, and both are unique. They ﬁnd that fair outcome was selected 8 out of
10 times, and the core was only selected twice. Eavey and Miller conclude that interpersonal
comparisons (fairness, altruism, universalism) can aﬀect outcomes in committees. Their
result presaged the recent wave of social preference models in behavioral economics.
2.4 Committee Bargaining with ﬁxed extensive forms
Eavey and Miller (1984b) modiﬁed the convener design by allowing the convener to make
exactly one proposal, and then the committee adjourns. That is, an agenda setter makes
at a k ei to rl e a v ei to ﬀer to the committee, when then decides between the oﬀer and the
status quo, according to majority rule. This is precisely the game form studied in Romer
and Rosenthal (1978), called the setter model. It is modeled as an extensive form game in
two stages. In the ﬁrst state, the setter makes a proposal. In the second stage, there is a vote
by the committee to accept or reject the setter’s proposal. Then the game ends. The perfect
equilibrium of the game is for the setter to propose the alternative he prefers most, among
those proposals that at least a majority (weakly) prefers to the status quo. This proposal
passes in equilibrium.
Eavey and Miller used both a discrete setting and a one-dimensional policy space and
found little support for the setter model. Rather than extracting all the rents, the monopo-
listic setter oﬀers proposals that leave something on the table for other committee members;
another indication of fairness, and possibly social preferences.
This mirrors similar ﬁndings for two person committees with strict majority rule, oth-
erwise known as the ultimatum bargaining game. In that game, one player proposes a split
of a ﬁxed amount of money. The second person either accepts the split or rejects it. If he
rejects, both players receive 0. The subgame perfect equilibrium is for the proposer to oﬀer
either zero or the smallest positive amount, and for the responder to accept the oﬀer. That
rarely happens. The modal oﬀer is an equal split and the mean oﬀer is about 60-40. Many
explanations have been oﬀered for this clear violation of subgame perfect equilibrium.
9McKelvey and Ordeshook (1981) also ﬁnd evidence that core selection depends on ﬁne details the pref-
erence proﬁle.
7The Rubinstein (1982) and Baron-Ferejohn (1986) bargaining models are comparable to
the ultimatum game and the setter model, respectively, but in a divide-the-pie, or distributive
politics, environment. The only diﬀerence is that the game does not end after the proposer
makes a proposal, but continues in some fashion (usually with the proposer changing over
time) in the event the proposal is rejected. In versions of these games that have been
conducted in the laboratory, the theoretical equilibrium has three essential properties:
1. Proposer Advantage: A committee member is better oﬀ if they are the proposer
than if they are not the proposer.
2. No Delay:T h eﬁrst proposal is always accepted in equilibrium.
3. Full rent extraction:T h eo ﬀer to the other members of the committee (or the other
bargainer in the two person case) is such that those voting for the proposal are exactly
indiﬀerent between voting for and against. Coalitions should be minimal winning.
There have been several laboratory studies of the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model, and
all have reached qualitatively similar conclusions that were foreshadowed by the Eavey-Miller
experiment with the setter model. Models that predict full rent extraction predict poorly if
responders are allowed to veto the outcome, either individually, or as part of a blocking
coalition. This means the proposer in all of these settings must trade oﬀ the value of better
proposal against the risk of having it voted down. But this risk implies that there must
be delay, due to the unpredictability about the responder’s behavior, and because diﬀerent
proposers will tolerate risk diﬀerently and have diﬀerent beliefs. But there should still be
a proposer advantage; and there is, although diminished somewhat because of the blocking
threat.
T h e r ei si n s u ﬃcient space to cover the vast number of experimental studies of bargaining,
both bilateral and multilateral. For bilateral bargaining, recommended reading is Roth
(1995) and Camerer (2004, Ch. 4). For committee bargaining a la Baron-Ferejohn, see
McKelvey (1991), Diermeier and Morton (2005), and Frechette, Morelli, and Kagel (2005).
In all these experiments, where members often have diﬀerent voting weights, one observes the
same three qualitative ﬁndings: proposer advantage, delay, and only partial rent extraction.
3 Elections and Candidate Competition
The second wave of political science experiments, which followed quickly on the heels of com-
mittee experiments on the majority rule core, investigated the question of Condorcet winners
in the context of competitive elections rather than small committees. These studies address
8many of the same questions that have received the attention of empirical political scientists.
The key questions we will focus on here are: spatial convergence of candidate platforms
in competitive elections; retrospective voting; and the importance of polls in transmitting
information to voters and coordinating voting behavior in multicandidate elections.
3.1 Competitive elections and the Median Voter Theorem
The median voter theorem says that under certain conditions, in two candidate winner
take all elections, candidate platforms will converge to the ideal point of the median voter.
The theorem applies under fairly general conditions in one dimensional policy spaces with
single peaked preferences, and under more stringent conditions in multidimensional policy
spaces. Basically, if Condorcet winners exist, they are elected. Does this happen? Casual
evidence indicates signiﬁcant divergence of candidate and party platforms, even in winner
take all elections. Laboratory experiments can help us understand why this may happen by
informing us about what conditions are essential for convergences and which are inessential.
There has been extensive work on candidate competition in the one dimensional world
with single peaked preferences and various conditions of information. The main contributors
to this eﬀo r ta r eM c K e l v e ya n dO r d e s h o o k ,a n dm u c ho ft h i si sd e t a i l e di nt h e i r1 9 9 0s u r v e y .
I will cover only the basics here. First, in two dimensional policy spaces when a Condorcet
winner exists, the candidates converge to that point. There is a process of learning and ad-
justment over time, but, just as competitive markets eventually converge to the competitive
price, platforms in competitive elections converge to the Condorcet winner. Their original
experiments showing this (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1982) were conducted with full infor-
mation. Candidates knew the preferences of all voters and voters knew the platforms of the
candidates. Candidates did not have policy preferences.
Through an ingenious series of subsequent experiments on spatial competition, McKelvey
and Ordeshook (1985a, 1985b) pursued a variety of issues, mostly related to the question
of how much information was required of voters and candidates in order for competitive
elections to converge to the Condorcet winner. Perhaps the most striking experiment was
reported in McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985b). These experiments used a single policy di-
mension, but candidates had no information about voters, and only a few of the voters
in the experiment knew where the candidates located. The key information transmission
devices they explored were polls and interest group endorsements. In a theoretical model
of information aggregation adapted from the rational expectations theory of markets, they
proved that this information alone is suﬃcient to reveal enough to voters that even unin-
formed voters behave optimally — i.e., as if they were fully informed.10 A corollary of this
10Voters also are assumed to know approximately where they stand relative to rest of the electorate on a
9i st h a tt h ec a n d i d a t e sw i l lc o n v e r g eo v e rt i m et ot h el o c a t i o no ft h em e d i a nv o t e r . T h e y
ﬁnd strong support for the hypothesis of full revelation to voters, and also ﬁnd support
for candidate convergence. However, in an extension of this experiment to two dimensions,
candidate convergence is slower; only half the candidates converge to the Condorcet winner
with replication.
A second set of experiments explores whether median outcomes can arise purely from
retrospective voting. The earlier set of experiments with rational expectations and polls
was forward looking and evaluation of candidates was prospective. In Collier et al. (1987),
voters observe only the payoﬀ they receive from the winning candidate after the fact —
not even the platform adopted by the winning candidate, nor the platform of the losing
candidate! There are no campaigns or polls. Voters either re-elect the incumbent or elect
an unknown challenger. Candidates are better informed: they observe all the platforms that
their opponent has adopted in the past, as well as the past election results. But candidates
are given no information about the distribution of voter ideal points. They ﬁnd that on
average candidates converge to the median, even without much information.
One of the implications of these results is that it is irrational for voters to gather costly
information, if other sources of information such as polls, endorsements, and word-of-mouth
are virtually free. This point is made in Collier et al. (1989). That paper and Williams
(1991) explore voter behavior and candidate convergence by extending these experimental
environments by giving voters the option to gather costly information about candidates.
These experiments establish two important facts. First, even in laboratory elections
where the stakes are low, election outcomes are well-approximated by median voter theory.
The Condorcet winner (core) is an excellent predictor of competitive election outcomes.
Second, this result is robust with respect to the information voters have about candidates
and the information candidates have about voters. Precious little information is needed — a
result that mirrors laboratory demonstrations that markets converge quickly to competitive
equilibrium prices and quantities, even with poor information and few traders.
There has been great concern voice by political scientists and pundits about low levels
of information in the electorate. One reason for this concern is a widely shared belief that
these information failures can doom competitive democratic processes. The McKelvey and
Ordeshook series of experiments dispels this doomsday view. Just as ﬁnancial markets
can operate eﬃciently with relatively few informed traders, or with many slightly informed
traders, the forces of political competition can lead to election outcomes that reﬂect public
opinion, even in information poor environments.
left right scale. But they don’t need any information about the candidates per se.
103.2 Multicandidate elections
In many elections, more than two candidates are competing for a single position using plu-
rality rule. In these multicandidate elections, there is a natural ambiguity facing voters and
in fact, almost anything can happen in equilibrium. The reason is that there are many Nash
equilibrium voting strategies. To see this, just consider a three candidate election, with the
candidates, A,B, and C having three distinct positions on a one-dimensional issue scale, say
the interval [−1,1].S u p p o s et h e r ei sav e r yl a r g en u m b e ro fv o t e r sw i t hi d e a lp o i n t ss c a t t e r e d
along the interval. Voters know their own ideal point, but have only probabilistic informa-
tion about the other voters. Then, for any pair of candidates, {i,j} t h e r ei saB a y e s i a n
equilibrium in which only these two candidates receive any votes, with each voter voting for
whichever of the two is closer to their ideal point. This is an equilibrium because it never
(instrumentally) pays to vote for a candidate who nobody else is voting for. Indeed there
can be some other equilibria, too (Palfrey 1989, Myerson and Weber 1995), but 2-candidate
equilibria are the only ones that are stable (Fey 2000). Voters face a coordination problem.
Which two candidates are going to be receiving votes? Will a Condorcet winner be chosen
if it exists?
Forsythe et al. (1993, 1996) explore these and other questions in a series of experiments.
Their laboratory elections had three categories of voters deﬁned by diﬀerent preference orders
over the three candidates. One group preferred A to B to C. The second group preferred
B to A to C, and the third group ranked C ﬁrst and was indiﬀerent between A and B.
The third group was the largest, but was less than half the population. Groups one and
two were the same size. Hence, if voters voted for their ﬁrst choice, C will win, but C is a
Condorcet loser11, since it is defeated by both A and B in pairwise votes. There are many
equilibria, including the three two-candidate equilibria noted above, but because of a special
conﬁguration of preferences and because there is complete information, sincere voting is also
an equilibrium.
First, they note that without any coordinating device, there is coordination failure. Some
voters in groups one and two vote strategically (i.e., for their second choice, trying to avoid
C) but many don’t, and the strategic behavior is poorly coordinated, so as a result the
Condorcet loser wins 90% of the elections!
Second, they look at three kinds of coordinating devices: polls, past elections, and ballot
position. Polls allow the voters in groups 1 and 2 to coordinate their votes behind either
candidate A or candidate B. This is indeed what happens. The Condorcet loser wins only
33 percent of the elections. Moreover, when either A or B is ﬁr s tr a n k e di nt h ep o l l ,t h e
Condorcet loser wins only 16 percent of the time. Election history also helped with coordina-
11A Condorecet losing candidate is one who is defeated in a pairwise vote with any of the other candidates.
11tion. There was a small bandwagon eﬀect between A and B. Whichever was winning in past
elections tended to win in future polls. Ballot position had an eﬀect on voting strategies,
but the eﬀect was too small to eﬀect election outcomes.
Their second paper looks at alternative voting procedures, comparing plurality rule to the
Borda Count (BC) and Approval Voting (AV). Both procedures worked better than plurality
rule, in the sense that the Condorcet loser was more easily defeated. Both procedures tended
to result in relatively close three-way races with A or B usually winning. Plurality, in
contrast, produced close three-way races, but with C usually winning.
This line of work has been extended in a number of directions. For example, Gerber,
Morton, and Rietz (1998) look at cumulative voting in multimember districts to see if it can
ameliorate problems of minority under-representation. Theoretically, it should due to the
similar problems of strategic voting and coordination. They run an experiment and ﬁnd it
makes a diﬀerence, and the data supports the main theoretical results.
In these studies, only voter behavior is examined, since there are no candidates in the
experiment. Plott (1991) reports experiments with 3-way plurality races where candidates
choose positions in a policy space, and voter ideal points are located so an equilibrium exists.
He ﬁnds that candidates tend to cluster near the equilibrium point.
3.3 Asymmetric Contests
In many elections, candidates are asymmetric. A widely cited source of asymmetry is incum-
bency. It is generally thought that incumbents have a signiﬁcant advantage over challengers,
above and beyond any advantage (or disadvantage) they may have due to spatial location.
Other sources of asymmetries include valence characteristics of candidates, such as a familiar
name, movie or athletic star status, height, articulateness, and personality traits. The two
key aspects of these valence characteristics are: (1) most voters value them, independent of
the candidate platforms; and (2) they are ﬁxed, rather than being chosen by the candidates.
With strategic competition, candidate asymmetries have interesting and systematic impli-
cations for equilibrium platforms. These asymmetric contests have been studied recently
both theoretically and empirically in game theoretic models by Erikson and Palfrey (2000),
Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999), Groseclose (2002), Aragones and Palfrey (2003, 2005), and
others.
Groseclose (2002) and Aragones and Palfrey (2003, 2005) show that valence asymmetries
lead to candidate divergence, even in one-dimensional spatial models. The equilibria, which
can be either mixed strategy equilibria or pure strategy equilibria (if candidates have policy
preferences and there is enough exogenous uncertainty) have two interesting features. First,
a disadvantaged candidate will tend to locate at more extreme locations in the policy space
than the advantaged candidate. Second, the extent to which this happens depends on the
12distribution of voters, in a systematic way. As the distribution of voter ideal points becomes
more polarized (e.g., a bimodal distribution), the disadvantaged candidate moves toward the
center, while the advantaged candidate moves in the opposite direction, and adopts more
extreme positions.
Aragones and Palfrey (2004) report the results of an experiment designed to test whether
these systematic eﬀects can be measured in a simpliﬁed spatial competition environment.
Candidates simultaneously choose one of three locations, {L,C,R}. The location of the
median voter is unknown, but they both know the distribution of voters. The median is
located at C with probability α, and located at either L or R with probability (1 − α)/2.
Candidate 1 is the advantaged candidate; he wins if the median voter is indiﬀerent (in
policy space) between the two candidates, which happens if the candidates locate in the
same position, or if one chooses L and the other R. Their main treatment variable is α,t h e
probability the median is located at C, which in diﬀerent sessions takes on values of either
1/5, 1/3,o r3/5. The equilibrium is characterized by a pair of probabilities of locating at
the central location, one for the advantaged candidate (p) and one for the disadvantaged
candidate (q). These equilibrium probabilities are ordered as follows.
0 <q 3/5 <q 1/3 <q 1/5 <
1
3
<p 3/5 <p 1/3 <p 1/5 < 1
The data perfectly reproduce this ordering of candidate locations, for all treatments. The
result appears to be robust, and has been replicated successfully with diﬀerent subject pools
and instruction protocols.
4 Information aggregation in committees
The standard model for information aggregation in committees is one in which a like minded
group of individuals must choose a policy whose (common) payoﬀ depends on an unknown
state of the world. But the committee has limited information about the state of the world.
To compound matters, this information is decentralized, with each member having some
piece of information. The task of the committee is to try to boil down this information into
a decision that would be as eﬃcient as the decision of a rational Bayesian who had access
to all the scattered pieces of information. Using a model with two states of the world and
t w oa l t e r n a t i v e s ,C o n d o r c e ta r g u e dt h a tm a j o r i t yr u l ew o u l db et h em o s te ﬃcient voting
method to solve this problem. While his 2x2 model has become standard, his approach and
conclusions about the superiority of majority rule has met with criticism because he assumed
voters would vote sincerely. That is, if a voter’s private information indicated policy A is
probably better than B, they will vote for A regardless of the voting rule. However, since the
13work of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), this assumption is now known to be ﬂawed, in the
sense that rational players would not necessarily vote that way. Nash equilibria of the voting
game can involve complicated strategies, and can lead to perverse outcomes. Moreover, the
equilibrium strategies are highly sensitive to the voting rule itself.
The key experimental paper in this line of research is Guarnaschelli et al. (2000). That
paper was inspired by the Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) result that the rule of unanimity
in juries is ﬂawed, since the Nash equilibrium may lead to a higher probability of convicting
the innocent than sub-unanimity rules, including majority rule. Furthermore, the problem
can be worse in larger juries than smaller juries. This directly contradicts the standard
jurisprudential argument for unanimity rules and large (12-member) juries. Naive intuition
suggests that raising the hurdle for conviction will reduce the chances of a false conviction.
But that intuition relies on an assumption that voting behavior is unaﬀected by the voting
rule, in particular, voters are nonstrategic. Game theoretic reasoning says the opposite:
when the hurdle for conviction is raised, voters are less willing to vote to acquit.
There are at least three reasons to be skeptical of the behavioral predictions of Nash
equilibrium in this setting. First, if the naive intuition of legal scholars and great thinkers
like Condorcet is that voters will be sincere, then why wouldn’t voters also follow the same
intuitive reasoning? Second, the strategic reasoning underlying the Nash equilibrium is
quite complicated, and its computation requires, among other things, repeated application
of Bayes’ rule and conditioning on low probability events (pivot probabilities). There is
ample evidence from experimental psychology that judgements of low probability events are
ﬂawed, and that individuals often fail to apply Bayes’ rule correctly. Third, the equilibrium
is in mixed strategies, and there is laboratory data in other contexts indicating that Nash
equilibrium does not predict that well in games with mixed strategy equilibria.
In fact, it was a fourth reason that motivated the experiment: Quantal Response Equilib-
rium (or QRE, McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998) makes much diﬀerent predictions about
the eﬀects of size and the voting rule compared to Nash equilibrium. The QRE model as-
sumes the players are strategic, and are aware other players are also strategic, but players
are not perfect maximizers.12 Rather than always choosing optimally, players choose better
strategies more often than worse strategies, but there is a stochastic component to their
choices, so inferior strategies are sometimes selected. With the additional stochastic term
in the picture, standard jurisprudential arguments emerge as properties of the equilibrium:
majority rule should lead to more false convictions than unanimity, and larger unanimous
juries produce fewer false convictions than smaller unanimous juries.
Ac e n t r a lﬁnding in Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) is that the predictions of QRE capture
the main features of the data quite well, both with respect to comparative statics and quan-
12The model reduces to Nash equilibrium if players are perfect maximizers.
14titatively, and most of the Nash equilibrium comparative static predictions fail. But perhaps
more interesting is what the data say about the three "obvious" reasons to be suspicious of
the Nash equilibrium behavior. (1) Do voters follow the same naive intuition as legal schol-
ars and great thinkers? No. They behave strategically.13 (2) Is the strategic reasoning too
complicated for voters in the laboratory to behave according to theory? No. Their strategic
behavior is consistent with the Logit version of QRE, which requires even more complicated
computation than the Nash equilibrium. (3) Does the fact that the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies lead to problems? No. In fact, QRE assumes that behavior in inherently stochas-
tic and accurately predicts the probability distribution of aggregate behavior. Analysis of
individual behavior in these experiments uncovers a wide diversity of patterns of individual
choice behavior. Aggregate behavior is consistent with the interpretation of mixed strategy
equilibria (or QRE) as an "equilibrium in beliefs."
Others have investigated variations on this basic jury model. Hung and Plott (2000) look
at majority rule juries that vote sequentially rather than simultaneously and obtain results
similar to earlier experiments with simultaneous voting.14 This provides some support for
the theoretical result of Dekel and Piccione (1999) that the order of voting does not matter
in this game.
Morton and Williams (1999, 2001) run experiments that are a hybrid of the Hung-Plott
sequential elections and earlier experiments described above on multicandidate elections.
Just as polls coordinate information for voters, so can sequential elections. Indeed this
is exactly the idea behind bandwagons in primary campaigns. Voters of the same party
converge on the candidate who seems most likely to win in the general election (ceteris
paribus). Diﬀerent voters have diﬀerent hunches about the electability of the candidates and
so the question is whether this information is gradually aggregated over sequential elections.
Their experiments show that voters do indeed learn from earlier results.15,
A related set of questions falls under the heading of social learning and information cas-
cades. These information aggregation problems are relevant to political science, economics,
sociology, and ﬁnance. Using the same information structure as Condorcet juries, a sequence
of decision makers chooses a private action, whose payoﬀ depends on the state of the world.
They have a piece of information, and are able to observe the choices of some subset of the
other decision makers. In the canonical version (Bikhchandani et al. 1992), the decision
makers move in sequence and can observe all the previous choices. In these models, it is
13Ladha, Miller, and Oppenheimer (1995) also ﬁnd evidence of strategic voting in information aggregation
experiments.
14In these experiments the majority rule Nash equilibrium is sincere voting.
15A somewhat diﬀerent bandwagon model (more closely aligned with the standard jury setup) has been
studied theoretically by Fey (1997) and Callander (2003).
15easy to have information traps, where after a few moves all decision makers choose the same
action, regardless of their private signal. This happens because the information contained
in the actions by a few early movers quickly swamps the information content of the small
piece of private information. These are called herds,o rinformation cascades. Several ex-
periments have been conducted to test whether these information cascades can be observed
in the laboratory. Anderson and Holt (1997) do observe such phenomena, even though they
only consider sequences of 6 decision makers.
However, these herds turn out to be quite fragile. A subsequent experiment by Goeree
et al. (2004) looks at longer sequences of 20 and 40 decision makers. They ﬁnd that while
herds do form, they usually collapse very quickly, leading to a cycle of herd formation and
collapse. Beliefs apparently do not become stuck, so the information trap seems to be
avoided. For example, they ﬁnd that herds on the "correct" action are more durable than
herds on the incorrect action, and as a result there is a tendency for information cascades
to "self-correct." Furthermore, they ﬁnd a decreasing hazard rate: the probability a cascade
collapses is a decreasing function of how long it has already lasted. In a companion paper
Goeree et al. (2003) prove that these features of the cascade cycles are consistent with the
same QRE model that was applied earlier to the jury experiments. In a QRE, there is full
information revelation in the limit, as the number of decision makers becomes large.
5 Voter Turnout and Participation
Fiorina (1990) dubbed it "The paradox that ate rational choice theory." A typical statement
of the paradox is the following. In mass elections, if a signiﬁcant fraction of voters were to
turn out to vote, the probability any voter is pivotal is approximately equal to zero. But if
the probability of being pivotal is zero, it is irrational to vote because the expected beneﬁts
will be outweighed by any tiny cost associated with voting. Hence the fact that we see
signiﬁcant turnout in large elections is inconsistent with rational choice theory. A common
(but misguided) inference from this is that rational choice theory is not a useful approach
to understanding political participation.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) take issue with the logic of the paradox. They point out
that turnout should be modeled as a "participation game", and that zero turnout is not
an equilibrium of the game, even with rather high voting costs. In fact, as the number of
eligible voters becomes large (even in the millions or hundreds of millions), they prove the
existence of Nash equilibria where two-party elections are expected to be quite close and in
some cases equilibrium turnout can be nearly 100%. Those high turnout equilibria also have
some other intuitive properties; for example, the minority party turns out at a higher rate
than the majority party.
16Schram and Sonnemans (1996) present results from an experiment designed to not only
test the Palfrey-Rosenthal theory of turnout, but also to compare turnout in winner-take-all
(W) elections to turnout in proportional representation (PR). They studied 2 party elections
with 12, 14, or 28 voters in each election. The main ﬁndings were:
(1) Turnout in the early W elections started around 50%, and declined to around 20% by
the last election. The decline was steady, and it’s not clear whether it would have declined
even further with more experience.
(2) Turnout in the early PR elections started around 30%, and declined to around 20%
in the last two elections. The decline was very gradual in these elections, and it’s not clear
whether it would have declined even further with more experience.
(3) The eﬀects of electorate size and party size are negligible.
One puzzling feature of their data is that initial turnout rates in the PR elections were
so much lower than initial turnout rates in the W elections. A possible explanation is
coordination failure and multiple equilibria. While both voting rules have multiple equilibria,
it is only the W elections for which equilibria exist with high turnout rates (above 50%). My
interpretation of these experiments is that the severe multiple equilibrium problems identiﬁed
by the theory present tremendous strategic ambiguity to the subjects and render the data
almost useless for evaluating the eﬀect of voting rules and electorate size on turnout. Despite
this shortcoming, the experiments provide an interesting source of data for understanding
coordination failure and the dynamics of behavior in coordination games.
Levine and Palfrey (2005) take a diﬀerent approach to addressing comparative statics
questions about the eﬀect of electorate size, relative party size, and voting cost on turnout
in W elections. Their design follows Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), where all voters in a
party have the same beneﬁt of winning, but each voter has a privately known voting cost
that is an independent draw from a commonly known distribution of costs. The equilibria
of these games, involves cutpoint strategies, whereby voters in party j with costs less than
a critical cost, c∗
j vote and voters with costs greater than c∗
j abstain.
They conduct an experiment where electorate size can take on values of 3, 9, 27, and
51 and the cost distribution is chosen so as to avoid multiple equilibria. For each electorate
size, N, there are two party size treatments, called toss-up (T)a n dlandslide (L). In the T
treatment, the larger party has N+1
2 members and the smaller party has N−1
2 members. In the
L treatment, the larger party has 2N
3 members and the smaller party has N
3 members. This
produces a 4×2 design.16 In all elections, there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The
comparative statics of the equilibrium are simple and intuitive. Turnout should be decreasing
in N for both parties. Turnout should be higher for both parties in the T treatment than
in the L treatment. Turnout should be higher for the smaller party than the larger party,
16When N =3 , the toss-up and landslide treatments are the same.
17with the exception of N =3 , an unusual case where the larger party has higher equilibrium
turnout.
The aggregate results conclusively supportive of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium compar-
ative statics. Table 1 below compares the observed turnout rates to the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium predictions.
Table 1 here.
All of the predicted qualitative comparative statics results are observed. The results are
also very close quantitatively to the equilibrium predictions, with one caveat. The turnout
probabilities are slightly less responsive to the treatment parameters than equilibrium the-
ory predicts. This is particularly noticeable for the largest electorate, where the turnout
probabilities are signiﬁcantly greater than the predicted ones. These attenuated treatment
eﬀects are consistent with QRE, which, in particular predicts higher turnout than the Nash
predictions for large electorates, and lower turnout in the N =3treatment.
There are two other kinds of laboratory experiments that are related to the voter turnout
question. The ﬁrst of these is voluntary contribution public good games, where individuals
can sacriﬁce some personal earnings for the beneﬁt of other group members. The most strik-
ing results are seen in experiments where it is a dominant strategy for to contribute nothing,
as in the Prisoners Dilemma. This has a long tradition, and the interested reader is referred
to the excellent (but now somewhat dated) survey by John Ledyard (1995). This research
has identiﬁed an array of environmental, institutional, psychological, and sociological fac-
tors that inﬂuence the degree of cooperation in these games. This variety reﬂects the many
disciplines that have contributed (and continue to contribute) experimental research in this
area.
The second group of related experiments examine threshold public goods games. In these
games, there is a single group and each member faces a participation cost. If the total number
of participants exceeds a known ﬁx e dt h r e s h o l d ,t h e ne v e r y o n ei nt h eg r o u pr e c e i v e sap r i z e ,
and the value of the prize exceeds the participation cost. These are generalizations of the
game of chicken and the stag hunt games, rather than the prisoners dilemma game. The
voter turnout game is only slightly more complicated, with the threshold of each party being
endogenously determined by the turnout choices of the other party. Thus it is as if there were
a random threshold.17 A series of experiments by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991, 1993, 1994)
study incomplete information versions of the these games (analogous to the Levine-Palfrey
incomplete information versions of turnout game) and explore the eﬀects of communication
and repeated play. They ﬁnd that the Nash predictions are fairly accurate, but there is
17See Suleiman et al. (2001).
18strong evidence that the players have biased beliefs about the contribution behavior of their
opponents: the behave as if they think the other members of the group are more generous
than is actually the case. Goeree and Holt (2005) investigate a more general class of games
that include these threshold games.
6 Concluding thoughts
The short length of this chapter required leaving some gaping holes in the political economy
laboratory experimental literature. To complete the picture of political science experimen-
tation (or at least the "economic" brand of such) would require an much deeper discussion
of the all the above topics, especially the early experiments on committee bargaining in a
spatial setting.
What is on the horizon in the coming decade of laboratory research in political economy?
Using history as a guide, laboratory experiments in political economy will follow the cur-
rent trends in theory. Thus, for example, new experiments relating to the design of optimal
voting procedures in committees a r eag o o db e t ,s i n c et h e r eh a sb e e naﬂurry of theoretical
research on this recently. In fact, we are beginning to see some experiments along this line,
such as Hortala-Vallve (2004) and Casella, et al. (2003, 2005), which explore the behavior of
laboratory committees using novel voting methods that allow members to express strength
of preference. The research on deliberation and information transmission in committees with
conﬂicting preferences (e.g., Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2005, Meirowitz 2004) suggest a
wave of experiments that would be a hybrid of the early committee experiments and the
more recent experiments on information aggregation in juries. A third set of experiments is
suggested by theoretical models of endogenous candidate entry. These could blend insights
from the earlier experiments on candidate spatial competition and more recent experiments
on entry and coordination in abstract games. To date there have been no experiments that
investigate citizen-candidate models of political competition, and other models of compe-
tition where entry and candidate policy preferences are important factors. Fourth, in the
study of both politics and economics, there is a new behavioral revolution in theory that
relaxes the model of perfect rationality, borrowing liberally from results in experimental psy-
chology. This theoretical approach will surely be complemented and enriched even more by
laboratory experiments in the coming years.
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